
















































The idea that government policies have unintended consequences has 
become a fixture of political argument, indeed a cliché. One can hardly 
get through a day’s newspaper editorials without encountering it with 
respect to something in the news—the TARP bailouts, the North 
Korea bailouts, executive pay caps, local issues such as the drinking 
age and the driving age. “Unintended Consequences” is the title of 
many recent books—by Deepak Lal on the role of culture and politics 
in economic performance, by Peter Galbraith on the Iraq War, others 
on housing policy, drug policy, military history, technological change, 
a novel about gun control, even a Spider Man comic book. If you go to 
the blogosphere you will find almost a genuine google of postings 
based on the idea. 
The phenomenon is a curious one if you take the term literally. 
Virtually every action of any consequence, private as well as public, 
has some consequences that were not part of the purpose of the action. 
If you attend a lecture at the American Enterprise Institute you may 
make an important contact but miss an important phone call or email. 
The human drama is replete with best laid plans going awry. Looking 
at things through the other end of the telescope, virtually every event 
has innumerable but-for causes, all the way to that Kansas tornado 
whose path is affected (according to chaos theory) by the flapping of a 
butterfly’s wings in China. The manipulation of but-for causation is a 
staple of time-travel science fiction. Why should it be interesting and 
important that a government policy had consequences that were not 
intended? 
                                                            
* This paper is based on a Bradley Lecture delivered at the American Enterprise 
Institute on June 8, 2009. The paper is longer than the lecture, and reflects comments 
offered at the time of the lecture, for which I am most grateful. 
† D. C. Searle Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. I.  Unintended Consequences in Government and Politics 
Unintended consequences may be a cliché, but like most clichés it 
contains a durable truth. In intellectual history, the discovery of the 
ideas of complexity, system, and ecology led to the realization that 
when one element in a complex system changes, other elements will 
change as a result, and then others, sometimes with profound 
consequences for the system as a whole. We are now long familiar 
with the fact that, in biological systems, one change—a mutation, the 
arrival of a new predator—will generate a cascade of adaptive 
responses. When the change is purposive, as in the introduction of a 
pesticide or antibiotic, the adaptations may altogether defeat the 
purpose—new, more resistant and aggressive pests or viruses may 
appear, and the system as a whole may have been weakened by the 
intervention in its ability to resist them. 
Further complications arise in human social and economic 
systems: all actions, initial and responsive, are undertaken with some 
degree of purpose and foresight—and we, the observers, are part of 
the system and have purposes of our own and interests in the results. 
Adam Smith introduced the then-revolutionary idea that individuals 
pursuing their selfish interests promote a result—the prosperity of 
others and of the society as a whole—which was no part of their 
intentions. Of course, the individuals pursuing their selfish interests 
may fail to achieve them, even as they advance the public good (that 
they will fail to achieve them entirely is certain). And when they 
pursue not just their material self-interest but some larger social 
purpose, the hurdles in their path multiply. The sociologist Robert K. 
Merton published a big paper in 1936 on “The Unanticipated 
Consequences of Purposive Social Action.” He was concerned not 
only with the actions of government (he mentioned prohibition and 
measures to revive the economy) but broadly with all purposive acts 
of individuals and groups—entrepreneurs, labor unions and other 
private associations, theologians and churches, and his fellow 
intellectuals. His reasons for unanticipated consequences included 
ignorance, error, short-term thinking, and “the essential paradox of 
social action—[that] the ‘realization’ of values may lead to their 
renunciation.” The paper had a sensational, unsettling impact on 
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later lead the neoconservative movement in its efforts to understand 
unanticipated consequences at the level of practical policy. 
It is certainly a good thing that discussions of government 
policy should be informed by these general considerations, and aware 
that government is a human enterprise working within a complex 
social ecology. But I think there are three particular reasons why the 
idea of unintended consequences has come to play such a prominent 
role in political debate. 
First, in political debate, unintended consequences almost 
always means unintended negative consequences. The Interstate 
Highway System, begun in 1956, probably had the unintended benefit 
of hastening the collapse of racial segregation in the south, but I have 
never seen the point in debates over highway policy. Sometimes 
“unintended” means nothing other than “unfortunate.” In a recent 
interview, Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
said that taking military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear 
weapons would have unintended consequences. In the next sentence 
he said that permitting Iran to acquire nuclear weapons would also 
have unintended consequences. He meant simply that this is a case 
where all of the options are unattractive. If he had been reading AEI 
publications, he might have added that negotiating with Iran over its 
nuclear program will also have unintended consequences. 
And if policy consequences are negative, they must be 
unintended. It is a custom of democratic politics, certainly of 
American politics, to give one’s adversary the benefit of the doubt 
regarding intentions and motivations. Unless we are dealing with an 
obvious crook such as Rod Blagojevich or a political leper such as 
David Duke, we say that the gentleman is well intended and just as 
dedicated to the public good as we are, but is regrettably misinformed 
and mistaken in his policy positions. The custom is often ignored by 
radicals and increasingly by workaday pundits, but it continues to be 
followed by think-tankers and other earnest academic reformers, by 
most mainstream commentators, and by essentially all politicians. 
T h e  r e s u l t  i s  t o  f o c u s  d e b a t e  o n  c o n s e q u e n c e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  
intentions. I may think that the purveyors of the sugar import quota 
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the public be damned. But what I say is that I admire their efforts to 
provide hard-working sugar farmers with market stability and to 
counter unfair foreign child labor. Then I say that I have discovered 
that the quotas have inadvertently done more harm than good. They 
have raised prices to consumers, induced the development of sugar 
substitutes that have made things worse for the sugar farmers, and 
caused children south of the border to turn from sugar cane to poppies 
and thereby to a life of crime. 
A wonderful example of the convention appeared in a paper on 
the 2008 financial crisis by former Senator Phil Gramm, delivered at 
AEI in January and later published in the Wall Street Journal. He said 
that the housing bubble-and-bust that precipitated the crisis was an 
unintended consequence of the Federal Reserve Board’s low-interest-
rate policies of the early 2000s, which had had the worthy purpose of 
getting us out of the previous, dot-com bubble-and-bust. That was 
probably a polite way of passing over his true views of the policies of 
his friend Alan Greenspan. Of course Greenspan and the Fed had not 
intended to set the stage for financial catastrophe. But cheap-credit 
policies have time and again purchased short-term relief at the cost of 
deeper problems down the road. The consequences, in kind if not in 
degree, were hardly beyond anticipation. 
The second reason is that government and politics are uniquely 
complex and contingent. The problematics of purposive social action 
identified by Robert Merton are certainly present in government 
action, but government is in a class by itself. The state, in Max Weber’s 
formulation, is the monopoly of lawful violence. Its essence is the use 
of fearful and often harmful means—physical coercion—for purposes 
of achieving desirable ends—public goods, from peace to pollution 
control. Weber emphasized the moral dilemmas of combining violent 
means with idealized ends, but the practical dilemmas are equally 
important. 
The state actor, whether a king or a chairman of the House 
Committee on Ways and Means, is much more constrained than a 
private actor—by the competition for power and the necessity to 
maintain support for the exercise of power. And when action is taken, 
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bound to be resistance of various kinds. Within a population of any 
size, there will be a spectrum of differing circumstances, interests, 
values, and resources among individuals and groups, and where 
coercion is involved the stakes will often be very large. The resistance 
will often have the advantage of surreptitiousness or at least privacy. 
In response, the state actors will be in the unique position of being 
able to change the rules in mid-game. 
That will typically be seen as an advantage, but over time it is 
often a weakness. It is very difficult for government to lash itself to the 
mast, to foreswear short-term opportunism, to credibly pre-commit to 
staying a course. A constitution and an independent judiciary are only 
partial solutions to this problem. Today our government could not 
possibly make an effective commitment not to rescue large banks that 
fail through excessive risk-taking. That creates “moral hazard,” the 
tendency of insurance to encourage the very behavior insured against. 
In private insurance markets, moral hazard is routinely policed by 
contract. Modern American government is essentially a gigantic 
insurance company, in both domestic and international affairs—but 
one whose ability to regulate moral hazard is disabled by its own 
unbridled power. And moral hazard is a prime source not only of 
unintended consequences but of perverse consequences, a subject I 
will get to in a moment. 
Imagine a chess game in n dimensions, where some of the n 
players are known to only some of the others, some players are 
committees that include some other players and that decide moves by 
vote, and some players have budgets for exchanging the identities of 
their pieces as the game proceeds—knight for rook, pawn for king. But 
even that would not capture the full complexity of political action. In 
politics, the participants come and go but the game itself never ends. 
A player can gain advantages but never win (it is said that all political 
careers end in failure), and so may play for immediate advantages that 
disadvantage those who come later. 
The extreme contingency of politics and government is the 
source of interest of counterfactual history, a field ploughed by Niall 
Ferguson, Newt Gingrich and William Forstchen, and others. The field 
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it does not yield policy advice. If Lee rather than Meade had prevailed 
at Gettysburg, the Union might have defeated the Confederacy sooner 
because the crisis might have impelled Lincoln to put Grant in charge 
without further delay. But it is difficult to say what the next general or 
president should make of this, beyond what could be gleaned from 
studying actual history. Strategic theory formalizes the lessons of 
conflict: when to hold ‘em and when to fold ‘em, when to advertise 
and when to conceal one’s own constraints, how to snatch victory 
from defeat. But strategy is advice for participants on how to win, not 
advice on the right result for everyone else. 
The third and most important reason for the focus on 
unintended policy consequences is that the term has inherited a 
secondary, more precise meaning from an earlier time. That meaning 
is that policy consequences are not merely unintended but perverse—
counterproductive and self-defeating—and to some extent are 
systematically perverse. The harder-edged proposition was forged by 
economists and neoconservatives during the period of great social, 
political, and intellectual ferment in the 1960s and 1970s. A pointed 
bold assertion has now evolved into a pervasive mild cliché. This may 
reflect the passage of time from a revolutionary moment to one of 
relative stability, as background radiation is the faint remainder of the 
cosmic Big Bang. But it also reflects a certain fudging, the result of 
uncertainty over the parameters and generality of the stronger 
proposition. So let us see what that proposition was, and is, made of. 
II.  Perverse Consequences—The Neoconservatives 
The argument for perverse policy consequences had two branches, 
neoconservative and economic. The neoconservative branch was 
concerned primarily with social welfare policies—some of them going 
back to the New Deal, but most undertaken through the Great Society 
programs of the mid- and late-1960s, and later including the racial 
affirmative action policies begun in the early 1970s. The line of 
argument was heralded in two seminal books, Jane Jacobs’s The Death 
and Life of Great American Cities (1961) and Martin Anderson’s The 
Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1942–1962 (1964) 
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works argued that government efforts to improve the conditions of 
urban life—city planning in the case of Jacobs, federal urban renewal 
in the case of Anderson—had instead made those conditions much 
worse. The urban neighborhood was a dense living ecology of social 
relationships; patterns of daily living and working; norms of public 
behavior; and implicit understandings about the uses of sidewalks, 
shops, and other public spaces. Efforts to improve housing and public 
spaces, imposed from the outside according to abstract notions of 
good design, uprooted the organic connections between society and 
physical environment. “Urban blight” is the term planners used to 
describe lively but ramshackle city neighborhoods. They left worse 
blight in their paths. 
Arguments of this form then appeared in profusion during the 
next two decades, especially in the pages of The Public Interest, 
founded in 1965 by Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell. It was a time of 
great social turmoil—urban crime and riots, family breakdown, 
growing illegitimacy, worsening race relations, deteriorating 
municipal finance, and menacing developments in major cities such as 
the appearance of pornography “combat zones” and large numbers of 
homeless vagrants. The government’s response was LBJ’s Great 
Society—the War on Poverty, community action, and Model Cities 
programs and others concerned with education, job training, and 
transportation. The theme of the neoconservative critique was that 
these liberal interventions were making matters worse. They were 
heedless of the cultural underpinnings of the problems they 
addressed. By substituting government provision for the obligations 
and opportunities of civil society, they were pouring gasoline on the 
cultural fires. When Kristol said that a neoconservative was a liberal 
who had been mugged by reality, the reality he had in mind was the 
incorrigibility of human nature and social institutions. 
It was an astonishing argument, altogether different from the 
traditional conservative complaints about the costs and waste and 
abuse of welfare spending and departures from constitutional 
tradition. Welfare programs were not only bad for taxpayers but even 
worse for recipients. Urban aid programs were not only costly for the 
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extension of the argument, racial affirmative action programs were not 
only bad for whites but even worse for blacks. 
The neoconservative apotheosis came in 1984 with the 
publication of Charles Murray’s Losing Ground: American Social Policy 
1950–1980. It analyzed a wide range of welfare programs with great 
subtlety and depth, but became best know for its proposition that 
AFDC (Aid for Families with Dependent Children, first established in 
1935 during the New Deal) was making poverty worse by fostering 
long-term welfare dependency, discouraging workforce participation, 
and encouraging illegitimacy and family breakdown. To the welfare 
reformers in the Ronald Reagan White House, this appeared as a 
bizarre and incomprehensible thesis—in California and Washington, 
their efforts had been aimed at getting the cheats and welfare queens 
off the rolls so as to leave more money for the deserving poor. But by 
the end of his second term, President Reagan himself had come 
around; many good liberals did too, and a decade later the Murray 
argument was embraced in the Welfare Reform Act of 1996. 
In 1988, Nathan Glazer, Irving Kristol’s coeditor at The Public 
Interest since 1973, published a book titled The Limits of Social Policy, 
which summarized the neoconservative argument as follows: 
1.  In our social policies we are trying to deal with the breakdown 
of traditional ways of handling distress. These traditional ways 
are located in the family primarily, but also in the ethnic group, 
the neighborhood, the church. 
2.  In our efforts to deal with the breakdown of these traditional 
structures, our policies are weakening them further and making 
matters in some important respects worse. We are making no 
steady headway against a sea of misery. Our efforts to deal with 
distress are themselves increasing distress. 
Glazer did not, however, believe that the neocons had 
discovered any general theory or immutable law of policy perversity. 
The deterioration of social institutions had been a manifestation of 
profound cultural developments. Even where the government policies 
had predated the social problems, as in the case of AFDC, the 
empirical record was ambiguous regarding causation. Government 
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do better next time . 
Murray acknowledged that the empirical record was not itself 
decisive but pressed harder for a systematic theory. Government, even 
one without political or resource constraints, had but two things to 
offer: rules and money. “Any compulsory transfer,” he wrote, 
“unavoidably puts a terrific burden on the rule-maker to be ‘right’ in 
decisions that call for very subjective, difficult judgments about who 
has a greater need of what, and about long-term versus short-term 
outcomes.” Murray then worked through a relatively easy case, 
having nothing to do with the social pathologies of the sixties and 
seventies, to determine when rules and money transfers might be 
expected to do more good than harm. We have a billion dollars to 
spend in any way we like to encourage cigarette smokers to quit. After 
analyzing the parameters of the problem, we decide to pay a 
substantial lump sum, $10,000, and to focus on heavy smokers at 
greatest health risk. Eligibility is limited to people who have smoked 
at least a pack a day for five years; quitting is remaining smoke-free 
for one year, and no one may reenlist after quitting. 
Under reasonable assumptions, our program is a debacle. Of 
those who qualify at the outset, some would have quit anyway, but 
others are indeed pulled over the line by the reward. Over time, 
however, the program easily induces more smoking than quitting. 
There are many marginal smokers—those who smoke less than a pack 
a day, or have smoked for less than five years, and were going to quit 
on their own—for whom $10,000 is a powerful inducement to extend 
their habit a bit. After they smoke more or longer, their addictions 
deepen and quitting rates decline. E v e r y t h i n g  w e  d o  t o  f i x  t h e  
program—targeting lighter, newer, or younger smokers—raises 
additional complications. The result is robust across assumptions 
about smoking populations and degrees of addiction, although if we 
assume that it is really easy to quit we can achieve results that are not 
perverse but merely wasteful and ineffective. The only program that 
generates net benefits is a one-time, never-to-be-repeated reward to 
current heavy smokers. But then Murray removes the stipulation of 
political autonomy. Our program has been a big success, editorial 
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it and gives us a bigger budget! Which destroys the one program 
element—the element of surprise—that had been essential to success. 
Democracy plus success equals moral hazard and failure. 
III.  Perverse Consequences—The Economists 
The second, economic branch of the perverse-consequences school 
was centered at the University of Chicago, American Enterprise 
Institute, and Brookings Institution; it made a few appearances in The 
Public Interest but published mainly in academic journals such as the 
Journal of Law & Economics and Journal of Political Economy and in AEI’s 
Regulation magazine. The focus was not social welfare programs but 
regulation and antitrust—policies that are all rules and no money, and 
that aim to improve the operation of markets. Here the arguments 
were not so new as those of the neoconservatives. Economists had 
been demonstrating the ineffectiveness of price regulation for a very 
long time. That the minimum wage produced unemployment among 
some of the intended beneficiaries—those whose labor was worth less 
than the legal wage and would have been willing to work for a lower 
wage—was a staple of economics courses. But now economists turned 
to the work of the regulatory agencies—the Progressive Era and New 
D e a l  a g e n c i e s  s u c h  a s  t h e  I n t e r s t a t e  C o m m e r c e  C o m m i s s i o n  ( I C C ) ,  
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Power Commission 
(FPC), Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), and those regulating public 
utilities, banking, and insurance; the newer, 1970s programs of “social 
regulation” such as those of the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA); and the 1970s programs of economy-
wide wage-and-price controls and energy regulation. 
The economists found that these programs were almost 
invariably ineffective. Sometimes they produced social benefits, but 
less than expected and at very high cost, as in many studies of EPA 
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a famous study by George J. Stigler of SEC financial-disclosure 
requirements. But in a remarkable number of cases they found that the 
programs worsened the very problems they were supposed to 
ameliorate. One simple study, really just a price survey, showed that 
airline fares within California, which were entirely unregulated, were 
lower than CAB-regulated interstate fares on the East Coast; this was 
an important weapon in the battle for airline deregulation. But the 
most important contributions—the regulatory equivalents of Murray’s 
Losing Ground—were two studies by Sam Peltzman in the early 1970s 
that appeared first in the Journal of Political Economy and were later 
expanded into AEI monographs. 
The first study showed that the FDA requirement that new 
pharmaceutical drugs be proven effective before they could be 
marketed had been a public health disaster. Before the requirement 
was introduced in the early 1960s (adding to the long-time 
requirement that drugs be proven safe), ineffective new drugs had 
quickly flopped in clinical practice—so there was little the regulatory 
requirement had to add to market performance. But the considerable 
costs and time delays of demonstrating efficacy through clinical trials 
had done tremendous health damage. First, they had delayed the 
introduction of many effective new drugs, typically by several years 
during which, under the previous regime, the drugs would have been 
saving lives and ameliorating disease. Second, by shortening the 
effective patent life of new drugs, the delays had reduced returns on 
investment in pharmaceutical research and development and thereby 
suppressed such investment. The damage greatly outweighed the 
benefits of averting the occasional ineffective drug. 
The second Peltzman study found that NHTSA automobile 
safety regulation, in particular the initial seat-belt requirement, had 
increased the frequency and severity of automobile accidents. Belted 
drivers were certainly much better protected when accidents occurred, 
but their greater safety led them to drive more aggressively—which 
led to more accidents that injured unbelted passengers and, in 
particular, pedestrians. 
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of regulatory settings. Two instances, mentioned by Peltzman himself 
in his 2004 Distinguished Lecture at the AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
for Regulatory Studies, concern the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The ADA forbids 
discrimination in employment against disabled people and requires 
“reasonable accommodation” of their disabilities. In practice, this has 
increased the risks and costs of hiring and employing the disabled, 
especially during initial periods when a new hire’s on-the-job 
proficiency is being assessed. As a result, employment rates for the 
disabled have fallen noticeably. Under the ESA, owners of land where 
endangered species dwell may not alter the land in any way that 
harms the species. The program’s record of recovering species that it 
identifies as endangered is practically zero. One apparent reason, 
documented in case studies, is that once a species is added to the 
endangered list, owners of land adjacent to current dwelling places 
accelerate and intensify development plans, so their land becomes 
inhospitable before the species grow in numbers and migrate there. 
A glance at the AEI website will reveal many plausible 
suggestions of the Peltzman Effect in current regulation. The financial 
bailout drama of 2008—saving firm A on Monday, letting similar firm 
B fail on Tuesday, arranging a shotgun merger of firms C and D on 
Wednesday, all without any explanation of the grounds of decision or 
of how the next case would be judged—probably worsened the 
collapse by introducing massive uncertainty into credit markets. In a 
recent AEI lecture, Alan Greenspan lamented and puzzled over the 
lack of creation of new banks—free of toxic assets and ready for 
lending. The reason, according to Alex Pollock, is that the regulatory 
authorities are actively discouraging new banks so as to channel 
capital into the incumbent troubled banks, many of them now holding 
substantial government investments. 
Regulation is so frequently counterproductive as to raise the 
questions raised by Glazer and Murray in the context of money 
transfers: Are perverse consequences inherent in the regulatory 
enterprise, and if so to what extent? There are some answers to be had 
in the nature of regulatory politics and program structure. For one 
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ambiguous. If the true purpose of the minimum wage is not to aid 
marginal workers as a whole, but instead to benefit some marginal 
workers at the expense of others, then the fact that the program 
increases unemployment is not really perverse or unintended. Despite 
political niceties, everyone knows that the real purpose of sugar 
import quotas is to restrict supply for the benefit of domestic 
farmers—and higher prices are inherent to this purpose. Even when 
regulatory commissions are established with the genuine purpose of 
protecting consumers against the economic power of large suppliers, it 
is the suppliers who will attend most closely to programs’ 
administration over time—so it is not surprising that the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and similar agencies evolved into price-fixing 
cartels. Pre-1980s antitrust policy, which the Obama Administration is 
hoping to resurrect, protected some firms from more efficient rivals 
and thereby perverted the purpose of protecting market competition 
and consumer welfare. Some of this was simply economic mistake and 
misguided populism, but an important cause was that most antitrust 
complaints are filed by disgruntled competitors, not consumers. 
Interest-group politics aside, the very act of substituting 
administrative procedures for market procedures can defeat 
regulatory purposes. The insurance business is unconcentrated, with 
lots of competing firms of varying sizes, and it is subject to strict and 
o f t e n  h i g h l y  p o p u l i s t  r e g u l a t i o n  i n  s o m e  s t a t e s  a n d  v e r y  l i t t l e  
regulation in other states. Insurance rates are generally higher in the 
populist, highly regulated states. The culprit is the requirement that 
rate changes be publicly filed in advance, followed by (at a minimum) 
a waiting period. That suppresses normal price competition and gives 
each firm detailed advance knowledge of what his competitors are up 
to. Recently enacted credit card legislation, hailed by President Obama 
as a stroke for consumer protection, imposes a similar procedure on 
changes in interest rates; it will have a similarly perverse result. 
It is also possible that the sheer size and ambition of modern 
government have become dysfunctional. Friedrich Hayek’s great 
teaching—that diverse and particular economic knowledge cannot be 
concentrated in one place sufficiently to permit intelligent decisions 
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regulators. Although the rationale of the mission-specific regulatory 
agency was that it would permit policies based on expertise (a French 
word adopted in the United States during the New Deal), no one who 
has observed the workings of the agencies will think that they know 
remotely as much as individual market participants, let alone the 
collective wisdom of the whole crowd. Going beyond Hayek, Ronald 
Coase, who edited the Journal of Law & Economics through most of the 
1960s and 1970s, suggested that the problem of centralized decision-
making had become one of organization as well as information. 
Although he (curiously) chose a spending rather than regulatory 
example, his sally is worth quoting: 
I have come to the tentative conclusion that government at the 
present time is so large that it has reached the stage of negative 
marginal productivity, which means that any additional function 
it takes on will probably result in more harm than good. . . . If a 
federal program were established to give financial assistance to 
Boy Scouts to enable them to help old ladies cross busy 
intersections, we could be sure that not all the money would go to 
Boy Scouts, that some of those they helped would be neither old 
nor ladies, that part of the program would be devoted to 
preventing old ladies from crossing busy intersections, and that 
many of them would be killed because they would now cross at 
places where, unsupervised, they were at least permitted to cross. 
IV.  Perverse Consequences of Regulation— 
An Alternative Explanation 
I want to suggest an alternative reason for thinking that regulation is 
systematically ineffective and often perverse. The problem is inherent 
in the nature of regulation itself and is more fundamental than the 
problems of politics, program design, information, and organization 
that I have mentioned. 
Regulation is characteristically discussed in terms of broad 
purposes—correcting market failures, internalizing externalities, 
protecting consumers, averting financial bubbles, smoothing off the 
rough edges of capitalism. But what it comes down to in practice is the 
promulgation of rules, usually very narrow and specific rules, 
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prices, product designs, production methods, the uses of land or other 
property, the information firms provide to investors or consumers, the 
forms of financial or operating arrangements among firms, or who 
may provide goods or services in certain markets. Functionally, a rule 
may be thought of as a government-mandated term inserted into an 
otherwise private contract that has many terms. The government 
specifies or limits a price, a feature of product design, a disclosure 
statement, a method of production. Before the regulatory intervention, 
the contract terms reflected purposes that were wholly private—
consumers’ varying preferences, and producers’ varying efforts to 
satisfy those preferences at minimum cost and maximum profit. Then 
the government adjusts a single term in an effort to achieve a public 
purpose. But myriad contract terms remain unregulated—and they 
naturally adjust, in response to the change in the regulated term, as 
consumers and producers continue to pursue their private purposes, 
which are independent of the public purpose. 
Of course the regulator may specify more than one contract 
term—utility commissions typically regulate both price and service 
quality. But even the simplest of contractual arrangements involve 
innumerable terms, many of them subtle and implicit and therefore 
difficult to observe and control from the outside. Consider that price is 
itself a many-faceted thing, much more than a single number and 
some of the facets unobservable. Price may include financing from the 
seller, which may be explicit, as in the case of automobiles, or implicit, 
as in the case of payment terms (cash or thirty days, past-due fees, 
more or less patience with past-due accounts). Price may include 
volume discounts or loyalty discounts, may vary by time and method 
of payment and delivery, and may interact with the prices of 
complementary goods or services from the same supplier or others. 
And suppliers may charge a lump sum to become a customer in the 
first place, a device doctors are now using to maintain their practices 
in the face of Medicare price controls on individual medical services. 
To the extent that unregulated price elements adjust to compensate for 
regulated ones, regulation will be simply ineffective in raising or 
lowering price. The revised pricing regime may benefit some 
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but it will typically be less advantageous on the whole, else it would 
have been adopted without the government’s requiring it. 
Rules may also regulate quality—specifying the design or 
features of products and services, disclosure and advertising, or 
production methods. These rules also present opportunities for 
offsetting adjustments within the activity being regulated, especially 
in information provision. The recent additions to corporate accounting 
and financial-disclosure obligations, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and other laws, have prompted a marked reduction in other, less 
formal and more qualitative forms of corporate reporting—annual 
reports have grown mum and opaque. Consumer product labeling 
requirements, as for food ingredients and nutrition, have prompted 
many clever revisions in packaging and quality claims. The FDA’s 
campaign to prevent drug manufacturers from informing doctors 
about “off label” uses of approved drugs (that is, uses that have be 
found effective in clinical practice but that the FDA has yet to add to 
the label) have prompted alternative, albeit inferior, methods for 
keeping doctors up to date.  But quality regulation frequently consists 
of requiring some additional product feature or more costly method of 
production, and the potential for offsetting adjustments in features or 
production is limited. 
Where quality regulation is effective, the next line of 
adjustment is price—and where price regulation is effective, the next 
line of adjustment is quality. The price of today’s automobiles includes 
thousands of dollars for safety and pollution-control equipment. 
When the CAB effectively held airline fares above competitive levels, 
airlines competed in service quality more than they do today—many 
of the first 747s featured piano bars. When banks were forbidden to 
pay interest on savings and checking accounts, banks gave their 
depositors consumer goods as premiums (that is the source of the 
current joke: “Buy a Toaster, Get a Free Bank!”). Conversely, the 
quality of transfused blood is lower where payment for blood is 
restricted or prohibited. One area where it is reasonably clear that 
price-reducing controls have prompted quality adjustments that have 
increased total expenditures is physician and hospital services under 
  - 16 -   Medicare. Here, it has been relatively straightforward to adjust the 
composition of supply (substituting clinical tests for physical exams, 
for instance) in response to the higher demand that the price controls 
have generated. 
The final form of adjustment is the behavior of the parties to 
the regulated contract and of others who are not party to the contract. 
This is the Peltzman Effect—extra-contractual behavioral responses, 
which are difficult or impossible to control through rules and are 
probably the most important source of regulatory ineffectiveness and 
perversity. I have said that the contracts regulators are attempting to 
revise reflect the private purposes of consumers and producers. But 
the contract itself is not their purpose, but only a means—and only 
one of many possible means—to the pursuit of larger purposes. The 
regulated parties have been pursuing their purposes subject to 
resource constraints (that is the definition of human choice). All the 
regulator has done is to add an additional constraint. When the price 
or quality of a good or service is changed, the quantity demanded by 
consumers and supplied by producers will change, consumers and 
producers will substitute other activities in pursuit of their private 
purposes, and third parties will accommodate to the new activities. 
Here are a few examples of how this works: 
In the price reduction arena, price controls on natural gas, oil, 
and other energy sources have regularly produced shortages and 
queues, such as the famous gas station lines of the late 1970s. At a 
minimum, these responses eliminate some of the intended cost 
savings of the price controls; they may eliminate all of them or more—
increasing total costs. 
In the price increase arena, inflated sugar prices have 
accelerated the introduction of sugar substitutes, and inflated 
telephone rates have accelerated the introduction of Internet 
telephony. These are instances of the general tendency of price-fixing 
cartels to sow the seeds of their own destruction. 
In the quality change arena, the addition of pollution-control 
and safety devices to new cars has led to price increases that have 
induced many people to continue driving older cars, which are less 
safe and produce more pollution, longer than they would have. 
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new plants than existing plants, have slowed the pace of retirement of 
older, dirtier plants. The reductions in the rate of introduction of new 
pharmaceuticals, in the employment of disabled people, and in the 
habitats for endangered species are similar responses. In these cases, 
the behavioral adjustments compromise the achievement of the 
regulatory purposes. They may go so far as to altogether defeat the 
regulatory purposes or to exacerbate the problems addressed. 
Let me conclude this discussion with six propositions. The first 
three summarize the argument so far; four, five, and six then extend 
the argument and lay the groundwork for the final section.  
First, the regulator, in attempting to achieve some public 
purpose, faces a powerful headwind of private purposes that are 
independent of the public purpose and operate directly or indirectly 
against its achievement. 
Second, the regulator’s means of achieving the public purpose 
consist of issuing and enforcing explicit rules. Explicit rules are a small 
subset of the multifarious means by which producers and consumers 
pursue their private purposes. 
Third, private contractual and extra-contractual responses to 
government rules will always compromise the achievement of the 
rules’ purposes to some degree, and will sometimes altogether defeat 
those purposes or produce opposite results. One can escape this 
conclusion only by assuming that the government rules will 
themselves nudge private behavior in the direction of the purposes 
behind the rules. That is not impossible, but experience suggests that 
private purposes, especially in economic markets, are extremely 
durable in the face of adjustments to specific rules. 
Fourth, the greater the divergence between public and private 
purposes, the greater will be the tendency for private responses to 
nullify government rules. This is the regulatory analogue to Charles 
Murray’s demonstration that paying people to quit smoking produces 
more smoking when it is hard to quit but is merely ineffective when it 
is easy to quit. In the limit, a government rule that replicates a private 
rule will be perfectly ineffective—there will be no private adjustments, 
and only dead-weight costs of rule-making and enforcement. Thus, if 
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introduction for a two-year trial period, it would largely replicate 
private behavior and eliminate the suppression of effective new drugs. 
A government price or product-quality rule that departs only 
modestly from the market rule may be easy to adjust to within the 
contract, nullifying but not perverting the public purpose. Larger 
departures will be increasingly difficult to adjust to within contracts, 
leading to behavioral responses: partial or complete withdrawal from 
the contract market and the pursuit of private purposes by alternative, 
less desirable means. The alternative means can easily produce results 
opposed to the regulatory purpose. 
Fifth, regulatory ineffectiveness depends critically on the rate 
of technological change or other “natural” (i.e., unregulated) social 
change. Newer products and production methods are more efficient 
than those they replace. Efficiency improvements will typically 
include lower cost; more complete use of inputs; less pollution and 
other uncompensated by-products; and quality improvements that 
include attributes, such as safety, that consumers value independently 
of regulatory purposes. When price-increasing quality regulations 
slow the rate of replacement of older industrial plants, automobiles, 
and consumer products subject to safety, environmental, or energy-
conservation mandates, this will typically compromise the 
achievement of the regulatory purpose. Similarly, when private social 
norms—for example, the propensity to hire and accommodate 
disabled people—are changing on their own, regulation may slow the 
rate of change. 
This is not to say that private social and technological change 
always moves in the direction of regulatory purposes—although I will 
suggest in the next section a reason for thinking that this will usually 
be the case. For now, the important point is that the greater the rate of 
change, the greater the potential for regulation to be self-defeating. At 
the same time, a higher rate of unregulated progress will complicate 
the demonstration of regulatory ineffectiveness or perversity. The 
clearest demonstrations come from looking at the effects of new 
regulation at the time of imposition—the Americans with Disabilities 
Act in 1990, the FDA drug-efficacy requirement in 1962. But over time, 
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government rules from those of private developments. A regulatory 
program may have highly perverse consequences, but those 
consequences may be swamped in the aggregate by other 
developments, and the proof will depend on assumptions about the 
other developments, or comparisons with the experience of other 
nations with different policies; these are subject to greater 
disagreement than a before-and-after study covering a brief period of 
time. The highway fatality rate has been falling constantly since the 
onset of automobile safety regulation in 1966—at about the same rate 
as before 1966, but that was a long time ago. Workplace safety has 
been improving since OSHA was established in 1970, but a big part of 
the story is probably the maturing of the baby boomers who were 
fresh to the workplace back then; plant safety directors will tell you 
that OSHA rules are more often a hindrance than a help. In 1984, the 
economist Paul W. MacAvoy published a study finding that most of 
the reduction in industrial air pollution in the decade following the 
establishment of EPA in 1970 could be attributed to rising energy 
prices. No one would assert that EPA has been ineffective in reducing 
pollution in the aggregate over the past thirty-nine years, although 
there are many instances in which individual rules have been 
counterproductive at the margin. 
Sixth, the self-limiting and possibly self-defeating character of 
externally imposed rules is independent of the problems of interest-
group politics, administrative procedures, incomplete information, 
and excessive centralization that have been mentioned as sources of 
regulatory ineffectiveness. Even a regulator who is pristinely devoted 
to the public interest and in possession of perfect information will 
have limited ability to control, through issuing and enforcing rules, all 
of the private behaviors that affect the achievement of his policy goals. 
But in practice the rule-making problem will interact with the others. 
Producer and consumer groups that are politically well-situated and 
in possession of superior information may influence the structure of 
rules and program administration so as to provide opportunities for 
contractual and behavioral adjustments, even to the point of obtaining 
explicit exemptions. More generally, the official nature of government 
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those of private contracts: the government rules will carry stronger 
sanctions for their violation, but will be clumsier—slower to adjust in 
response to changing circumstances and the behavior of other 
participants, and more prone to sudden revision or abrogation for 
extraneous political reasons. Centralization of rule-making may create 
problems of its own (information deficiencies, per Hayek, and 
diseconomies of scale, per Coase), but will have the advantage of 
reducing opportunities for behavioral adjustments through out-
migration of people, plant, and capital: it is easier for markets to 
subvert New York City rent controls than a program of national rent 
controls. The policy-monopoly advantages of centralization are 
probably an important source of the problems of over-centralization. 
V.  Intended Non-Consequences 
The currently popular formulation of unintended policy consequences 
is a useful reminder that government actions usually set off complex 
courses of events with results the proponents had not anticipated. But 
a more precise formulation is available in many circumstances. At 
least where narrow-purpose money-transfer and regulatory policies 
are concerned, we can be confident that the results will fall short of the 
advertised purposes and will frequently defeat those purposes, 
making the problems addressed worse than they would have been. 
The stronger formulation merits greater investigation and assertion in 
policy debate—especially by philosophical conservatives now in exile 
in the political wilderness. Conservatives place a high value on 
individual liberty and think that the economy is generally more 
productive, and that society solves problems more successfully, when 
government is much more limited, decentralized, and restrained than 
i t  i s  t o d a y .  B u t  c o n s e r v a t i v e  p r i n c i p l e s  a r e  s e r i o u s l y  o u t  o f  o f f i c i a l  
favor for the time being. What is not out of favor is the American spirit 
of pragmatism and problem-solving, which is embraced across the 
political spectrum. To show that specific policies are failing to advance 
their own purposes, or are making matters worse, seems like a 
promising line of argument in current circumstances. And such 
showings are components of larger limited-government propositions 
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summon their return to practical political debate. 
B u t  I  w a n t  t o  p u s h  t h e  a r g u m e n t  a  s t e p  f u r t h e r ,  b e c a u s e  i t  
seems puzzling that the government should be doing such a great 
number of things that are pointless or self-defeating. We have, to be 
sure, seen some genuine progress. Losing Ground precipitated welfare 
reforms whose benefits are well-documented, and the FDA critiques 
by Peltzman and others led to modest but useful improvements in the 
regulation of new drugs. The CAB and ICC were abolished. Today’s 
information economy would have been throttled in the crib by pre-
1980 antitrust and FCC policies. And where the government does 
things itself, rather than giving orders to others, conspicuous perverse 
consequences have produced impressive improvement. In 1976, the 
government’s extravagant swine flu inoculation campaign, based on a 
single influenza outbreak that had sickened several hundred people 
and killed one, itself killed several hundred people; this year’s U.S. 
response to the Mexican swine flu has been vastly more intelligent and 
fine-tuned, even though this flu has been as surprising in its features 
as that of 1976. Nevertheless, the general pattern is persistence in 
failure. Even in the absence of a brilliant academic study, political 
officials and program administrators often have a keen sense that they 
are standing still or losing ground. Where is that can-do spirit I 
alluded to, and the natural process of improving by doing? 
I want to suggest that policies that are flaccid and porous, with 
lots of room for maneuver on all sides and ample opportunities for 
unobservable avoidance, are a central feature of modern democracy. 
So far I have not used the word “incentives.” But an alternative way to 
explain the failure of welfare and regulatory policies is that they fail to 
create private incentives for the pursuit of their public purposes. 
Indeed they do the opposite: they create incentives for avoidance and 
for behavior that compromises or defeats their purposes. Perverse 
incentives are pervasive in the policies we adopt, but those policies are 
not the only ones at government’s disposal. Government has the 
means, through properly structured taxes and subsidies, to powerfully 
redirect private incentives toward intended ends. It doesn’t use them: 
it leaves the best arrows in its quiver. 
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perverse incentives and perverse results that he had identified in 
Losing Ground. His book In Our Hands: A Plan to Replace the Welfare 
State laid out a broad income-transfer program that would 
immediately eliminate much of the problem of strictly material 
poverty that has eluded poverty warriors for a half century, and create 
profound incentives for family and community regeneration. The 
book has not been a big success. Indeed the Murray Plan seems to be a 
political non-starter. Unconditional money transfers, and creating 
incentives for right conduct unmediated by rules and supervision, 
seem to be obnoxious ideas to many in the policy community of all 
political persuasions.  
Similarly, in 1975, in the midst of the previous oil-price shock, 
Congress determined that something had to be done to wean 
Americans from big, gasoline-guzzling automobiles and reduce our 
dependence on oil, especially foreign oil. The policy it chose was the 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy program—CAFE—which 
established minimum average fuel consumption standards for each 
manufacturer’s car and truck fleets of various categories. The program 
was described by all concerned as a landmark victory for energy 
conservation, and the claims have been repeated each time the 
standards have been tightened, m o s t  r e c e n t l y  b y  t h e  O b a m a  
Administration. But after a third of a century of CAFE, American 
drivers are consuming more fuel per capita than they did in 1975. 
Part of the reason is that the program has tried to push auto 
design only slightly ahead of what it would have been anyway under 
the influence of prevailing gasoline prices. Part is that, to the extent 
the car standards were binding, a big loophole was maintained for 
what became popular new forms of vehicles—family vans and SUVs. 
And an important part has been behavioral responses—Peltzman 
Effects—that no regulatory redesign could counter. Cars that are 
lighter, less powerful, and more expensive per capacity measure are 
less attractive to many people, and this has led to a substantial 
lengthening of the life-spans of older, less fuel-efficient vehicles. And 
drivers of new cars with higher miles-per-gallon have responded to 
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of the conservation gains. 
N o n e  o f  t h i s  w a s  f o r e o r d a i n e d  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  
action. If Congress had instead imposed a substantial gasoline tax, say 
several dollars per gallon, the conservation effects would have been 
immediate, pronounced, and inescapable and would have been 
realized in all vehicles of every size, both old and new. Private 
incentives would have been aligned with rather than against the 
avowed public purpose. But there would have been another response 
that would have been even more immediate: there would have been 
rioting in the streets, and every legislator who voted for the tax would 
have been retired at the earliest opportunity. Americans do not want 
their driving incentives realigned. Instead, in the same statute that 
established CAFE—the misnamed Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act of 1975—Congress lowered gasoline prices through price controls 
on domestically produced crude oil. That would have led to more 
rather than less fuel consumption—except that the cost savings were 
themselves consumed by the time-costs of the gas station lines of the 
late 1970s. 
Let me generalize from these examples and a few additional 
ones. When it is proposed that the government solve a problem, that 
means, by definition, altering some prevailing course of events in the 
society, and that means altering the behavior of some individuals and 
groups. The bigger the problem, the more numerous are the people 
who will have to change their ways, the more they will have to 
change, or both. But people do not like to be forced to change their 
ways, even when they acknowledge that it would be desirable for 
everyone to do so. And political representatives and government 
officials are their agents—they must be responsive to the very people 
who need reforming. These circumstances create powerful incentives 
for crafting programs that have the public goal or purpose of correcting a 
problem, and seem plausibly related to correcting it, but in fact permit 
wide latitude for responsive adjustments. The adjustments are not 
without costs, but the costs and social disruptions will be radically less 
than a serious, full-throttled pursuit of the announced purpose would 
have entailed. Furthermore, in the case of regulation, the adjustments 
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rather than consumers. The resulting changes in price or quality that 
consumers observe will be difficult or impossible to differentiate from 
changes that would have occurred anyway (because of changes in 
market demand or production technology), and thereby to ascribe to 
government policy. 
I am not saying that political leaders intentionally devise do-
nothing policies. It is the process rather than anyone’s intent that is 
important. For every incipient government program, there will be 
committed legislative advocates, committed opponents, and many 
followers who are indifferent or uncertain and primarily concerned 
with maintaining their seats. Once a consensus has emerged sufficient 
to make some action likely, the advocates begin negotiating and 
compromising with the opponents and bystander-followers to gain 
the needed legislative majorities. That involves both popular politics—
avoiding action that would energize the opposition of large numbers 
of unorganized voters—and interest-group politics—the distribution 
of exemptions to those in a position to block the program, which 
compromises the program’s purpose (but not so much as to unduly 
weaken the support of proponents). Most of all, it involves crafting a 
program that a sufficient number of participants are “willing to live 
with.” That means a program that many people can see their way 
around. The possibilities, if not the precise nature, of behavioral 
adjustments will be implicitly anticipated in the fashioning of the 
legislative coalition; they will be insurance against the possibility of 
manifest disruptions once the program gets going. 
The current development of a cap-and-trade program for 
controlling emissions of greenhouse gasses is a striking instance of this 
phenomenon. It is a reprise of the politics of CAFE standards on a 
vastly larger scale. AEI scholars and many others have shown that a 
tax on the carbon content of fossil fuels could achieve a substantial 
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions in short order. Such a policy, 
however, would make the fabulous economic costs and dislocations of 
short-term reductions in ubiquitous CO2 emissions apparent for all to 
see: it would force immediate wrenching changes in production and 
consumption, and is therefore of no interest to practicing politicians. 
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either total carbon content in fuels or total CO2 emissions, and creating 
tradable permits totaling the amount of the cap) with the same 
economic and emission effects as a carbon tax of any given rate. But 
emissions cap-and-trade presents decisive political advantages. Unlike 
a carbon tax (or carbon cap-and-trade), emissions cap-and-trade 
requires monitoring tens of thousands of sources for a profuse, hard-
to-measure substance, which necessitates modeling and estimation 
procedures with wide latitudes for adjustment and fudging. 
Moreover, while emissions permits could be auctioned—yielding 
government revenues equivalent to a carbon tax—they can also be 
distributed for free—so that the value of the new resource constraint 
goes to those who receive the permits rather than to the government. 
That is the approach of the Waxman-Markey bill now under 
development in the House of Representatives. 
F r e e  p e r m i t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  n o t  i t s e l f  a  w e a k n e s s  f r o m  t h e  
standpoint of achieving a given emissions reduction. The permits will 
find their way, through trading, into the hands of those who can use 
them most efficiently, and the effects on prices of carbon-intensive 
products and services will be the same as if they had been auctioned. 
Indeed free distribution is a powerful advantage for the committed 
proponent of greenhouse gas reduction—because the permits can be 
given to political favorites, in particular to those who could effectively 
block legislation in the absence of payment. For the sincere proponent, 
giving opponents money rather than exemptions is vastly preferable, 
as Harvard’s Robert Stavins has argued. 
The problem is a different one. Under emissions cap-and-trade 
with free political distribution of permits, it becomes possible to set 
the cap, and distribute the permits, in such a way as to avoid the need 
for painful changes in production and consumption, and to conceal 
the ineffectiveness of the resulting regulatory scheme. In practice, free 
distribution promotes rather than displaces the distribution of 
exemptions. A large part of the legislative drafting has been devoted 
to ensuring that electricity consumers do not see price increases, and 
coal miners do not lose their jobs, at least not in the lifetimes of the 
drafters. But coal is such a large source of CO2 emissions that without 
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Disproportionate burdens can be shifted to the petroleum sector, but 
we know what American’s think of gasoline taxes, and the price of 
heating oil is a sensitive political subject in New England; so special 
dispensations can be expected here as well. There are several sources 
of such dispensation. In place of reducing emissions or purchasing 
emissions permits, firms will be allowed to purchase offsets—such as 
paying for planting trees or reducing emissions in foreign countries. 
Such transactions are hard to monitor and essentially impossible to 
assess for their real contribution (beyond what would have happened 
anyway) to greenhouse-gas reduction. A scheme for adjusting permit 
allocations over time according to reported current output and 
emissions seems designed to introduce subjectivity into the program 
and forestall price-increasing adjustments in production. 
And the greatest variable of all is the level of the cap, at the 
outset and down the road. A very low carbon tax, or a permit auction 
that generated a very low price, would immediately reveal that the 
program would be ineffective. The trading prices of freely distributed 
permits will be revealing, too, but much more complex and open to 
interpretation because of the varying obligations the program will 
place on different sectors. In the end, it will be possible to say that it is 
best to get the system in place now and tighten the screws later, as 
program experience accumulates and production technology 
improves. That is an excellent argument. It is also a confession of 
ineffectiveness—global warming proponents emphasize the urgency 
of immediate emissions reductions—and a means for postponing hard 
decisions to another day. The Waxman-Markey bill is profuse with 
special regulatory provisions—renewable-energy mandates, product-
efficiency standards, even a program for national building codes—that 
would be superfluous under an effective cap-and-trade program. 
The gulf between even a moderately effective greenhouse-gas 
program and a politically feasible program is so great that that it may 
be impossible to legislate anything beyond a symbolic bill justified as 
a first step on a long road. A final backstop is to leave the matter to the 
EPA: this would also guarantee a porous, ineffective program, because 
the Clean Air Act is designed to abate low levels of specific pollutants, 
  - 27 -   not a byproduct of all combustion. We shall see. The important points 
for the present discussion are these: 
First, it is extraordinarily difficult for a government that is as 
responsive to outside influence as ours is to enact policies that require 
genuine, substantial changes in private behavior. 
Second, rule-based regulation, combining ambitious formal 
purposes with ample room for escape from the rules themselves, will 
often present an attractive solution to the dilemma of highly 
responsive government. 
Third, highly responsive government will typically regulate in 
the direction of, rather than in opposition to, changes in technology 
and private behavior. Doing so is an aspect of responsiveness in the 
first place, and over time it will tend to produce results that appear 
successful and that mask the ineffectiveness or perverse consequences 
of rule-based regulation. The health, safety, and environmental 
regulatory programs of the past forty years have been prompted by 
increased public demand for the goods the programs seek to provide, 
and boosted by the fact that production technology and market 
d e m a n d  w e r e  t o  s o m e  d e g r e e  p r o v iding the goods independently. 
Greenhouse gas reduction is the hardest possible case: an effective 
program would require very large changes in private behavior, it 
appears that only an ineffective program is politically feasible for the 
time being, and the prospect that technological change will ameliorate 
the problem independently (e.g., through the development of low-
cost, non-carbon energy generation) remains highly uncertain. 
It remains to be said—recalling the proposition at the end of 
the previous section—that the coincidence of regulatory purposes and 
technological change does not reduce, and in fact increases, the 
potential for counterproductive regulation. When I was myself a 
government regulatory official in the early 1980s, it seemed obvious to 
me that the proposal to require new cars to be equipped with airbags 
(which inflate on collision) had delayed the introduction of this life-
saving technology for many years. Airbags are a conventional good—
their benefits redound to the purchaser, not to third-parties (following 
the logic of the Peltzman study, they may provide disproportionate 
benefits to purchasers at the expense of third parties). The basic airbag 
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technology existed and automobile manufacturers had produced and 
sold a few prototype versions in the 1970s. But the rate of market 
diffusion was critical, as in the case of other innovations such sun 
roofs and GPS navigation. A first-of-its-kind airbag—expensive, 
bulky, less proven than it would be—might be attractive to an affluent 
family living in a big city with two teenage sons, but worse than 
useless to a single woman of modest means who always buckled her 
seatbelt. With time and experience, quality would improve, price 
would fall, and the devices would become standard equipment. It was 
the regulatory proposal that all cars be equipped with airbags at 
once—at very high price and before the accumulation of practical 
experience and improvements—that shifted the calculus of 
manufacturers and led to an all-or-nothing political imbroglio that 
lasted nearly a decade. I know of no rigorous study of this thesis, but 
it is certainly plausible and was accepted by some NHTSA officials 
and automobile safety experts. If it is correct, the costs in highway 
deaths and injuries were very large. But those costs were masked by 
aggregate improvements in highway safety caused by other changes 
in technology, highway design, and driving behavior. And they are 
now dissolved in regulatory history: if NHTSA abolished the airbag 
rule today, the airbags would remain and continue to improve. 
Temporizing rather than solving problems is an important 
attribute of modern politics. That is not all bad: problems solve 
themselves in many cases. But when government comes along for the 
ride, and pretends to be at the head of the parade, it can do substantial 
damage along the way. A government that was more autonomous 
t h a n  o u r s — b e t t e r  a b l e  t o  g i v e  d i r e c t i o n s  a n d  l e s s  p r o n e  t o  t a k e  
directions—would be in a stronger position to solve genuine public 
problems but liable to other sorts of abuses. For better and worse, the 
government we have is characterized by big political talk and anemic 
policy action. In these circumstances, calling attention to the chasm 
between talk and action, and the collateral damage it can inflict, is a 
worthy task for political criticism and liberal reform. 
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